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Shame, Stigma and HIV
Considering Affective Climates and the Phenomenology of 
Shame Anxiety
ABSTR AC T
The affective climate often associated with HIV prevention and care practices is 
often dominated by negative emotions such as shame, fear and suspicion which 
arise because of HIV’s historical stigma. This article explores the experiential 
consequences of this affective climate and the continued stigma associated with 
HIV, through a focus on the experience of shame anxiety which can be under-
stood as the chronic anticipation of shame or shameful exposure. Exploring first-
person narratives of gay men living with HIV, the article gives an account of how 
shame anxiety is central to understanding how stigma causes harm, especially in 
experiences of chronic illnesses such as HIV. Using a philosophical framework, 
through phenomenology, it will be demonstrated how shame anxiety manifests 
in bodily lived experience through the structure of the “horizon”. The article will 
finish with reflections on how shame anxiety can act as a barrier to the effective 
delivery of health services for those with stigmatised chronic illnesses and, fur-
thermore, why the experience of shame anxiety might be useful to consider when 
delivering health services. 
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Introduction
WHILE IT IS widely recognised that HIV is a stigmatised condition and 
“reducing stigma” and creating “health-enabling environments” are 
important policy goals in relation to HIV prevention and treatment (Race 
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2018, 117), these goals remain abstract aims if not grounded in the bodily 
and affective lived experiences of individuals who face the social and per-
sonal difficulties inherent to HIV disclosure along with on-going health 
interventions and treatments. In his recent book The Gay Science, queer 
theorist Kane Race discusses a common “affective climate” often associ-
ated with HIV prevention and care practices as a result of HIV’s inherent 
stigma: it is “a shared context of fear, shame, secrecy, suspicion, rejection 
and avoidance…which materially and historically accumulates to make 
HIV prevention and care practices more (or less in this instance) pos-
sible” (Race 2018, 117). Race’s insights into the centrality of affect for the 
“contours of experience” and how affective experience in turn gives rise to 
“different practical possibilities (and indeed impossibilities)” in relation 
to sexual and social interactions, along with health-related care (Race 
2018, 52), provide an inroad for investigating how HIV-related stigma 
manifests affectively in lived experience and its practical consequences. 
While HIV stigma has been theorised and investigated extensively, 
there remains a curious lack of phenomenological clarity in the literature 
regarding how stigma manifests, or causes harm, in lived experience.1 
As should be apparent by the definition of the term, stigma – broadly 
understood as a mark of disgrace that can discredit an individual and 
their social standing (Goffman 1990; Tyler 2020; Scambler 2020) – is not 
something that is experienced directly (as we might experience the pain 
or discomfort associated with illness). Instead, stigma is experienced 
indirectly through association. Interpersonal and social experiences such 
as labelling, social exclusion, vilification, discrimination, prejudice and 
judgement come to be read to be the result of the stigma associated 
with one’s illness. As a result, while the concept of health-related stigma 
has been thoroughly theorised and conceptualised, “the mechanism by 
which stigma may cause distress remains largely unknown,” as Ben-
nett et al. have noted recently in their discussion of HIV (Bennett et al. 
2016, 87). In short, stigma is a socio-political category which cannot be 
experienced in itself, and while “stigma experiences” (Stangl et al. 2019, 
2), such as labelling, social exclusion etc., are clearly negative and poten-
tially harmful, the bodily and affective first-person lived experience of 
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stigma-related phenomena is often missing in discussions about stigma 
and stigma experiences. 
Naturally, the emphasis on the social manifestations of stigma is 
important, such that the individual does not carry the burden or blame 
for the negative attributes associated with their stigmatised condition, 
and so that stigma is recognised as a structural and political (rather than 
individual) problem. However, if one seeks to understand the mecha-
nisms through which stigma related to chronic illnesses, such as HIV, 
interferes with disclosure, treatment and positive health-related behav-
iours, adding to the burden of illness, then one must begin to investigate 
its “affective climate”, to return to Race’s contention. 
In this article, I am interested in following Race’s insights into 
the composition of a common negative affective climate surrounding 
HIV prevention and care – “fear, shame, secrecy, suspicion, rejection 
and avoidance” – while also exploring Hutchinson and Dhairyawan’s 
recent claim that shame, in particular, is central to HIV-related stigma. 
Hutchinson and Dhairyawan argue that to investigate HIV-related stig-
ma without also investigating shame, “is to miss much of importance; 
it is akin to studying ‘threats’ as social phenomenon, while ignoring 
the fear that people have in response to those threats” (Hutchinson & 
Dhairyawan 2017b, 225). Of course, the association between shame and 
stigma is nothing new, and Hutchinson and Dhairyawan are certainly 
not the first thinkers to posit connections between HIV-related stigma 
and shame (Bennett et al. 2016; Halperin & Traub 2009; Skelton et 
al. 2020). It is often taken for granted that stigma causes experiences 
of negative self-conscious emotions, such as shame, embarrassment, 
humiliation and disgrace. In fact, some theorists posit shame to be the 
result of “self-stigmatisation”, or the “internalisation of stigma” (Skelton 
et al. 2020, 2). However, many theorists and researchers use the term 
“shame” to signal the on-going experience of stigma, but do so with-
out explicitly exploring or theorizing the relationship between stigma 
and shame. These terms are often used interchangeably, while implicitly 
taking for granted a connection between the emotion and experience of 
shame and the social attribute of stigma.
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My aim in this article is to give a clear account of how the experi-
ence of shame, particularly shame anxiety, is central to understanding 
how stigma causes harm, especially in experiences of chronic illness 
such as HIV. As such, I follow Hutchinson and Dhairyawan’s intuition 
that shame is not only part of the affective climate when considering 
HIV disclosure, prevention and care, but also one of the core mecha-
nisms within HIV-related stigma that leads to distress, harm and an 
increased burden of illness. In this article, I will focus on accounts and 
testimony from gay men who are living with HIV. In doing so, I by 
no means intend to further entrench the debunked association between 
HIV and gay male populations. I draw on the case of Gareth Thomas’s 
HIV disclosure largely because of its contemporary and high-profile 
status within a UK context. In addition, it should be noted that HIV 
stigma for gay men is compounded by the stigma and shame historically 
associated with homosexuality and the “homosexual lifestyle” (Race 
2021). My analysis of shame anxiety, as it is related to HIV disclosure, 
in particular, and stigmatised invisible chronic illness more generally, 
is relevant to other populations and groups living with HIV, including 
those with other intersecting stigmas, such as sexuality, gender, race, 
poverty and addiction.
I will begin by discussing the relationship between stigma and shame, 
engaging with Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s account of shame (Sedgwick 
2003) to demonstrate the inherent relation between social bonds and 
shame experiences. I will then draw from the recent high-profile case 
of Welsh rugby player Gareth Thomas’s disclosure of his HIV status.2  I 
will draw on the moving and powerful first-person narrative shared by 
Thomas with the public through a video released via his Twitter profile, 
along with subsequent media interviews.3 Thomas’s narrative not only 
offers a visceral and honest account of the lived experience of stigma, 
but also reveals the common affective climate, identified above by Race, 
associated with HIV. I will argue that his account of living with stig-
ma demonstrates stigma’s structural relation to shame. I will offer an 
account of “shame anxiety”, borrowing and extending the term from 
Stephen Pattison’s discussion of chronic shame (Pattison 2000, 85). I 
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will then draw from resources from Edmund Husserl’s classical phe-
nomenology (Husserl 1977, 2001) and Sara Ahmed’s work in Queer Phe-
nomenology (Ahmed 2006), in order to investigate how shame anxiety 
manifests in bodily lived experience through the structure of the “hori-
zon”, exploring the possibilities, or non-possibilities, of queer shame in 
such an experience. I will finish with reflections on how shame anxiety 
can act as a barrier to the effective delivery of health services for those 
with stigmatised chronic illnesses and, furthermore, why the experience 
of shame anxiety might be useful to consider when delivering health 
services.
Stigma and shame
We generally use the term “stigma” to describe “the degrading marks 
that are affixed to particular bodies, people, conditions and places with-
in humiliating social interactions” (Tyler 2020, 8). Inflicting a stigma is 
convenient as it immediately marks an individual, or group of individu-
als, out as “abnormal”, “unacceptable” or “inferior” and indicates that 
it is permissible to treat them as less than fully human. Stigmas are 
inflicted silently and invisibly through the social norms and political 
machinations of a dominant social group that mark out certain behav-
iours, physical characteristics or circumstances as unacceptable or devi-
ant and, therefore, inferior. Stigma works both to isolate the one who is 
marked out as “inferior” and to build a sense of unity and commonality 
among those who remain in the fold.
Erving Goffman’s classical 1963 study Stigma: Notes on the Manage-
ment of Spoiled Identity gives an account of stigma that precisely high-
lights stigma’s relationship to physical and behavioural characteristics 
within interactional social relations where society is organised along the 
lines of inclusion and exclusion: the “normal” and those with so-called 
“spoiled identities” (Goffman 1990). Goffman defines stigma as an attri-
bute which an individual holds that is “deeply discrediting”; it is some-
thing which disqualifies a person from full social acceptance, marking 
them as defiled, deviant or non-normative by the “normals”, i.e., the 
dominant social group (Goffman 1990, 13, 15). Individuals bearing a 
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stigma understand themselves to be inferior and discredited within the 
dominant social order, even if they themselves do not share this belief 
regarding their inferiority. Goffman identifies various types of stigma, 
many of which are health-related (“abominations of the body” as he 
calls them (Goffman 1990, 14)). Following Goffman’s insights, stigma 
has become a useful concept in health research.4 It is a means to under-
stand the social impact of illness (Weiss, Ramakrishna & Somma 2006), 
or, in other words, how the experience of an illness may be concomitant 
with a range of social phenomena, such as discrimination, judgement, 
social exclusion, vilification, ostracism, labelling, status-loss, prejudice, 
and unfair treatment, among others (Link & Phelan 2001, 377).5  
HIV has been subject to “exceptionally high levels” of stigma (Parker 
& Aggleton 2003, 13), where long-standing associations between homo-
sexuality and social depravity have rendered the experience of contract-
ing HIV profoundly stigmatizing. While HIV can now be successfully 
managed as a chronic condition, and societal attitudes have changed 
significantly, it still “remains one of the most stigmatised health condi-
tions to date” (Skelton et al. 2020, 2). Often, those affected by stigma are 
deemed to be undeserving, perhaps unworthy of medical care; they are 
relegated to the margins of society for fear of contagion, both physical 
and moral. Ample evidence demonstrates that stigma can significantly 
worsen the burden of illness, impacting on health seeking behaviours, 
causing personal and social harm, and exacerbating existing social and 
health inequalities. In the case of HIV, for instance, the physical or 
functional limitations of illness are not what an individual deals with on 
a daily basis. Instead, what they are confronted with on a daily basis is 
societal and social responses to the illness and its associations (Susman 
1994). By investigating stigma we can thus determine how and where 
power and domination are circulating within the realms of health, ill-
ness, medicine and healthcare (Parker & Aggleton 2003), and the effect 
of these power relations on individuals. 
A health-related stigma may be visible, or “evident on the spot”, such 
as a disability or disfigurement, marking an individual immediately as 
“discredited” in the social order (Goffman 1990, 14). It may, however, 
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also be not “immediately perceivable”. In other words, some health-
related stigmas may be easily concealed or hidden, such as is often the 
case with HIV. In the latter case, the individual bearing the stigma is 
not yet discredited, but “discreditable” (Goffman 1990, 14), suspended 
with the interminable anticipation of judgment and social exclusion 
should their condition be discovered or revealed.6 Goffman quotes at 
length from Sullivan to illustrate aspects of the emotional texture of 
being discreditable:
The awareness of inferiority means that one is unable to keep out of 
consciousness the formulation of some chronic feeling of the worst sort 
of insecurity, and this means that one suffers anxiety and perhaps even 
something worse … The fear that others can disrespect a person because 
of something he shows means that he is always insecure in his contact 
with other people; and this insecurity arises … from something he 
knows he cannot fix. (Goffman 1990, 24)
An enduring awareness of one’s inferiority in the dominant social order 
manifests as “chronic” feelings of “fear” and “anxiety” in one’s contact 
with others, stemming from the risk of being judged, rejected and 
socially excluded. The affective register of being discreditable, I con-
tend – in part following Hutchinson and Dhairyawan – is thus that of 
anticipated shame.
The association between shame and the experienced aspects of stigma 
is posited in some health literature. However, what is surprising is that 
in much of the current literature regarding health-related stigma, shame 
does not even get mentioned (Weiss, Ramakrishna & Somma 2006; 
Parker & Aggleton 2003). When shame is discussed, there is still a lack 
of consensus regarding whether shame is a component of stigma, or a 
related, but separate experience (Nyblade 2006, 338; Bennett et al. 2016). 
In contrast to a broad lack of clarity regarding the relationship 
between shame and stigma, Graham Scambler explicitly discusses 
shame as a key experiential component to stigma in his article “Re-
Framing Stigma”. Scambler aims to describe how living with a stigma-
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tised illness impacts on the “biographies of those diagnosed” (Scambler 
2004, 33), shifting the analysis to a first-person perspective. Scambler 
discusses “felt stigma” as a means to differentiate the experiential 
aspects of stigma from the social phenomena attributed to it. He sug-
gests “felt stigma” has two referents: first, “the shame associated with” 
being reduced to the condition (e.g., “being epileptic”), and second, “the 
fear of encountering enacted stigma”, where “enacted stigma” refers to acts 
of discrimination on the basis that someone is perceived to be socially 
and culturally unacceptable (Scambler 2004, 33). Enacted stigma is, for 
Scambler, synonymous with “shaming” (Scambler 2018, 53). Scambler’s 
positing of a necessary relation between shame and the experience of 
stigma resonates with insights of other thinkers (Bennett et al. 2016; 
Hutchinson & Dhairyawan 2017a) who posit that stigma and shame 
are internally related, where shame is one of the possible, and perhaps 
necessary, experiential consequences of the social phenomena associated 
with being stigmatised (e.g., discrimination, prejudice, unfair treatment, 
ostracism, labelling, etc.). 
Goffman himself points out that “shame” is a “central possibility” in 
experiences of stigma (Goffman 1990, 18). However, Goffman’s under-
standing of shame, as it is briefly elucidated, characterises shame as a 
self-evaluative response, “arising from the individual’s perception of one 
of his [sic] own attributes as being a defiled thing to possess” (Goffman 
1990, 18), wherein an individual has internalised societal norms and 
comes to perceive themself as stigmatised, or as being defiled or lacking. 
This conception of shame corresponds to a common psychological for-
mulation of shame as arising when there is a perception of a discrepancy 
between the ideal self and the actual self (Scheff 2000, 97). This defini-
tion of shame is highly individualizing, relegating shame to the private 
psychological sphere. 
Shame, of course, is never an entirely private affair. Any experience 
of shame is personal and embodied, while also necessarily social and 
political: embedded in relational dynamics with others, while shaped 
by the norms and mores of one’s cultural and political milieu (Dolezal 
2015a). To understand why and how shame has the potential to be part 
ShAmE, StigmA AND hiV λ 55
of all experiences of stigma, particularly bodily stigma, a more expan-
sive understanding of shame is required: one that positions shame in 
human experience as centrally concerned with our inherent bodily vul-
nerability, sociality and need for belonging, or, in other words, as cen-
trally concerned with our meaningful connections to others. 
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick offers such an account of shame, drawing 
from child development literature to demonstrate that shame arises 
when the “interpersonal bridge” is threatened (Sedgwick 2003, 36). 
Shame, as Sedgwick draws out in relation to Silvan Tompkins’s affect 
theory, is an embodied response which signals to the subject that their 
connections to others are under threat, or that social bonds may be sev-
ered.7 As Sedgwick notes, “shame both derives from and aims towards 
sociability” (Sedgwick 2003, 37). Understanding shame in this manner, 
means that while not all shame is related to stigma, all stigma is infused 
with the potential for shame. Stigma is precisely about one’s identity 
and position in social relations: the fear of losing social bonds and being 
positioned as one of “them” in relation to “us” through discriminatory 
practices. As a result, being on the receiving end of stigma, or being 
stigmatised, necessarily invokes the structural experience of shame as 
outlined by Sedgwick: one becomes vulnerable through the threat to 
the social bonds one has with those who can ensure one’s social, and 
perhaps physical, survival. 
While a person may be stigmatised for a discrete part of their identity 
(e.g., an illness, the colour of their skin, their sexuality), it is important 
to note that stigma is never contained to the attribute in question, but 
instead attaches itself to the whole person. As a result, stigma envelops 
and affects the global self. As Goldin notes in relation to HIV, “stigma 
has tended to define the bearer rather than the sign carried by the bear-
er, and the bearer becomes known by the disease itself ” (Goldin 1994, 
1360). The bearer’s whole identity becomes defiled, discredited, shameful. 
In parallel, the shame associated with stigma is not limited to the stig-
matised attribute, but comes to affect an entire identity. As Sedgwick 
notes: “The forms taken by shame are not distinct ‘toxic’ parts of a group 
or individual identity that can be excised; they are instead integral to 
56 λ LUNA DOLEZAL
and residual in the processes by which identity itself is formed” (Sedg-
wick 2003, 63). Having a sense of self that is “tuned most durably to the 
note of shame” (Sedgwick 2003, 63) as a result of the stigma associated 
with one’s illness or disease, has concrete consequences for how one 
not only experiences one’s illness, but also how one constructs one’s self 
image and identity, and conducts oneself in relation to others. 
In this regard, Sedgwick is optimistic about shame. She posits shame 
as the primary queer affect and celebrates its positive potential for moti-
vating queer creativity. She argues that shame can generate a positive 
space for identity, signalling a collective departure from the sphere of 
“ordinary” power relations which mark queer identities as deviant (Sedg-
wick 2003).8 However, I believe the positive potential for queer shame 
is complicated by the manner through which shame actually manifests 
(or more accurately, does not manifest) in lived experience as a result 
of stigma. My contention is that if we want to understand how health-
related stigma, and its related social phenomena, are experienced by an 
individual and how this might impact on health-related behaviour and 
health outcomes, then we must understand how stigma-related shame 
is often experienced as non-experienced, or, as we shall see, as a “present 
absence”. 
Shame anxiety in HIV disclosure
On September 14, 2019, Welsh rugby player Gareth Thomas uploaded 
a powerful and emotional video onto Twitter where he publicly dis-
closed his status as HIV-positive. Thomas came out as gay in 2009 and 
is believed to be the first British sportsperson to go public about living 
as HIV-positive. Gareth Thomas’s testimony is a first-person account 
of the experience of living with a highly stigmatised invisible chronic 
illness, and the affective toll of concealing the illness. Thomas reveals 
that he was forced to publicly confess his HIV status as a result of a 
journalist having discovered his health status and revealing his secret to 
his parents (Godfrey 2020). While Thomas was able to secure an injunc-
tion to prevent the publication of a news story about him being HIV-
positive, he decided to make a public statement in order to dispel the 
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possibility that his HIV status would be revealed without his consent. 
In his emotive testimony in the Twitter video and subsequent media 
interviews and a BBC documentary, Thomas describes what it is like 
to live with the fear of being found out, evoking the twofold structure 
of Scambler’s “felt stigma” (shame and the fear of shameful discrimi-
nation), while also highlighting Sedgwick’s account of shame as cen-
trally concerned with our meaningful connections to others. Thomas’s 
account powerfully describes his reasons for concealing his illness, and 
the anticipated consequences of its revelation. I draw on Thomas as a 
case study, in the phenomenological sense, to highlight the experiential 
structure of what I will discuss as “shame anxiety”. While I recognise 
that Thomas’s account is not representative of all individuals, or even of 
gay men, living with HIV,9 I believe his account provides useful insights 
into a common “affective climate”, identified by Race, central to the 
experience HIV diagnosis, disclosure and treatment. Hence, my interest 
in his account concerns the experience of living with an invisible chronic 
illness, or in other words, Thomas’s account of his experience of his stig-
matised condition before publicly revealing his secret. I quote here from 
Thomas’s own account of his experience, bringing together quotations 
from several sources:
“I want to share my secret with you … I’m living with HIV. Now you 
have that information that makes me extremely vulnerable but it does 
not make me weak.”10 
“I’ve felt shame and keeping such a big secret has taken its toll.” 
“I had a fear people would judge me and treat me like a leper because of a 
lack of knowledge. I was in a dark place, feeling suicidal. I thought about 
driving off a cliff.” 
“To me, wanting to die was just a natural thought and felt like the easier 
way out, but you have to confront things.”
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“But the truth is I’m still scared even now of people finding out I’m liv-
ing with HIV and I’m s****ing myself and feel petrified about what the 
reaction will be, because we still live in an era where HIV is not spoken 
about.”
“I thought that if people knew about me being HIV positive they 
wouldn’t want to breathe the same air as me, they wouldn’t want to drink 
from the same cup as me and if I walked into a coffee shop everyone 
would just walk out because they’d be so scared of being infected by 
me.”11
“When you have a secret that other people know about it makes you really 
vulnerable towards them. And I just felt like I had no control over my 
own life.”
“It has all [receiving treatment] been shrouded in a sense of shame and 
from me entering the clinic to leaving always feels like a blur.”12
“I chose to fight and break the stigma around this subject.”13 
“The reason I’m doing this is because I want to remember what it’s like to 
live again; I want to remember what it’s like to feel free.”14 
The recurrent themes in Thomas’s testimony regarding the disclosure of 
his HIV status and his on-going treatment are fear, vulnerability, shame 
and stigma. Thomas’s fear of his secret being found out, is given its 
affective force by his anticipation of social vulnerability and shame, of 
being judged and possibly ostracised by others. Race identifies a similar 
constellation of concerns regarding HIV disclosure, where HIV-pos-
itive men are reluctant to reveal their health status (in this context to 
potential sexual partners) because of fears of “rejection and humiliation”, 
along with fear “that others might treat them contemptuously, judge or 
demonise them for being HIV-positive” (Race 2018, 64). These “affec-
tive complications” (Race 2018, 62) add to the overall negative “climate” 
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of  “fear, shame, secrecy, suspicion, rejection and avoidance” (Race 2018, 
117) that clearly also characterise Thomas’s vivid and affective descrip-
tions of his experiences. 
In Thomas’s account, the compulsion to contemplate suicide is not 
linked to his illness (which he initially assumed was potentially termi-
nal), but instead to his fear of social judgement and social exclusion. Or, 
if we follow Sedgwick’s account of shame as being inherently linked to 
vulnerability and sociality, his fear of shame. This association between 
fearing shame and suicide is by no means arbitrary, nor extreme; there 
are very high stakes involved when one feels socially vulnerable and has 
a sense that one’s social bonds are irreparably compromised. As Jane 
Megan Northrop notes, in cases of stigma “social death and actual 
death are imminently convergent” (Northrop 2012, 105). Tomkins con-
curs, noting that “loss of face [can] be more intolerable than loss of life” 
(Tompkins 1995, 136). Research confirms these insights, where shame, 
and unequal distributions of shame, can be strongly related to self-harm 
and suicide. When “shame becomes visible – when it is acknowledged 
– it can be felt more intensely” by those from stigmatised communities 
(Chandler 2020, 42). As a result, avoiding potential instances of shame, 
through concealing one’s stigmatised condition, can feel like a life-sav-
ing measure. When this concealment is no longer possible, suicide may 
seem like a logical option. 
Thomas’s account further highlights the structures of shame and 
shameful anticipation inherent to felt stigma. Thomas describes explic-
itly the actual shame he feels as a result of his condition and his on-going 
treatment, while also describing the potential shame he fears as a result 
of being found out, of his secret being revealed (by the journalist) and 
the subsequent judgement and discrimination that would ensue. It is 
living with this ongoing “fear” that led Thomas to feel that he had no 
“control of [his] own life” and as though he didn’t “feel free.”
The consequences of living with the anticipation of shameful expo-
sure in relation to the revelation of HIV status are eloquently described 
by Kane Race in a semi-autobiographical essay about his experience 
of receiving an HIV diagnosis in 1996, the same year that combina-
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tion anti-retroviral therapy transformed HIV from a death sentence to 
a chronic and manageable illness (Race 2021). In Race’s essay, we see 
striking structural similarities to Thomas’s account:
Soon after receiving my HIV diagnosis I made an appointment with a 
general practitioner with years of specialist experience in HIV care ... 
“Don’t tell your parents,” was the first piece of advice he offered me … I 
did hold off on telling my parents for some time … But living in con-
stant fear of imminent exposure with a stigmatized, sexually humiliat-
ing condition takes its toll ... It was only a matter of time before they 
discovered my dirty secret, I figured. In the narrative that dominated my 
parental imaginary, HIV operated as vindicating proof of sexual deprav-
ity: conclusive evidence of the wrongness of homosexuality and the fool-
ish lifestyle I was leading. I imagined my parent’s anger, disappointment, 
and deep shame on discovering that their only son had succumbed to the 
logical outcome of the homosexual lifestyle they had warned me against 
repeatedly. I had wasted my life, wasted everything, betrayed every 
hope they had invested in me. This apprehension of a wasted life filled 
me with a sense of impending catastrophe .... Intensely conscious of the 
shameful disappointment I had become, I lived in constant fear of public 
humiliation and unwanted exposure … [as a result of the] intense sexual 
shame that the possibility of having my HIV status outed to my parents 
unwittingly provoked in me (Race 2021).
For Race, the “constant fear” of exposure and sense of “impending 
catastrophe” was intimately linked to a negative evaluation of the self 
through the eyes of an “other”, in this case an “other” dominated by his 
“parental imaginary”. Race describes how shame is anticipated: he may 
at any moment suffer humiliating exposure and be judged for his “sexual 
depravity” and subsequently rejected. The explicit anticipation of shame, 
related both to his sexuality and HIV status, comes to be a defining 
feature of his lived experience. Likewise, in Thomas’s account, we see a 
fear of exposure and judgement leading to social exclusion: “I had a fear 
people would judge me and treat me like a leper”; “I’m still scared even 
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now of people finding out … feel petrified about what the reaction will 
be.” Both Race and Thomas, I argue, give accounts of the structure of 
stigma-related “shame anxiety”, where shame anxiety is understood, fol-
lowing Pattison, as an “anticipatory anxiety about the imminent threat 
of being exposed, humiliated, belittled or rejected” (Pattison 2000, 85). 
Living with shame anxiety does not mean that shame is experienced 
continuously, but instead that the threat of shame is predominant and 
persistent. There is a crucial distinction between the actuality of shame 
and the potentiality of shame. Living with a stigmatised invisible chronic 
illness involves both actual shame and potential shame, as Thomas’s tes-
timony reveals. Following Scambler’s structure of felt stigma, there is 
the shame related to one’s illness (actual shame) and the fear of enacted 
stigma where one is afraid of social rejection through discriminatory 
actions (potential shame). Shame anxiety is the experience of potential 
shame or the shame that is anticipated when one is afraid that one’s con-
cealed illness will be discovered and that one will be judged, scorned 
or ostracised. What is interesting in the experience of shame anxiety is 
that shame itself may not be present in the affective landscape. Instead, 
it manifests precisely as a “fear” of exposure, or a “chronic feeling of the 
worst sort of insecurity,” to invoke Sullivan on stigma again.
As a result, shame anxiety is frequently characterised by the absence, 
rather than the presence, of shame. Instead of the searingly painful self-
consciousness that accompanies episodes of actual shame, the experi-
ence of shame anxiety can render shame invisible, both to the self who 
is experiencing it, and to others around them. Shame is fastidiously 
avoided through control of one’s behaviour, interactions and actions, or 
through the avoidance of certain encounters, situations or conversations. 
As Pattison notes about individuals who live with shame anxiety: “They 
live their lives trying to avoid occasions and relationships that might 
provoke painful shame experiences” (Pattison 2000, 83). In the cases of 
Thomas and Race, shame is avoided through secrecy and concealment 
in certain situations and with certain individuals. Understood in this 
way, shame anxiety can be characterised as a persistent absence of shame, 
which is nonetheless experienced as present through anticipation. And 
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this “present absence” has tangible consequences in terms of how one 
experiences one’s behaviour, actions, social relations and broader world.
A phenomenology of shame anxiety
Understanding shame anxiety as a “present absence” gives us inroads 
to describing the experience through a phenomenological register and 
therefore to understanding how it manifests in lived experience. In 
Edmund Husserl’s classical phenomenological account of conscious-
ness, he demonstrates that all human experience is characterised by 
experiences of “present absences”: what is “strictly non-experienced but 
necessarily also meant” (Husserl 1977, 23). Husserl uses the concept of 
the “horizon” to capture this idea, borrowing meaning from how we 
understand horizon in the usual sense as the limit of what is visible or 
perceptible (Geniusas 2012, 1). The horizon is not a fixed location, but a 
shifting limit of possible experience. As such, the horizon acts experien-
tially as a real limit point demarcating what is experienced from what is 
“non-experienced”, or a “non-presence” but nonetheless within the realm 
of possibility and, hence, in some sense part of experience. 
Hence, “horizons”, for Husserl, “are ‘predelineated’ potentialities” 
in our experience (Husserl 1977, 45). Due to its temporality, our expe-
rience has a horizonal structure. In an act of perception for example, 
when looking at a table, I will at any given moment only be able to see 
one side of the table. If I am looking down at the table, the underside 
of the table, for instance, is part of the table’s horizonal possibility. In 
other words, in an act of visual perception, the non-visible aspects of the 
table remain “co-present” but in some sense absent. Hence, perception 
involves a constant relationship between presence and absence, or “full-
ness and emptiness” to use one of Husserl’s formulations (Husserl 2001, 
44). As Husserl sees it, all conscious experience is characterised in this 
horizonal way, as a blend of absence and presence, or fullness and emp-
tiness. Any experience is surrounded by horizons of possibility – spatial, 
temporal, experiential – that are co-present, but currently absent.
In her book Queer Phenomenology, Sara Ahmed takes up Husserl’s 
notion of the “horizon”. She discusses how the horizon is more than 
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what is currently absent (but possible) in experience, and instead argues 
that the horizon “is what gives objects their contours” and “makes them 
available … for me” (Ahmed 2006, 55). Extending the concept of “hori-
zon” both existentially and politically, Ahmed argues:
what ‘comes into’ view, or what is within our horizon, is not a matter 
simply of what we find here or there … What is reachable is determined 
precisely by orientations that we have already taken. Some objects don’t 
even become objects of perception, as the body does not move toward 
them: they are ‘beyond the horizon’ (Ahmed 2006, 55).
What this means is that horizons are not neutral possibilities in an 
objective world, but instead are shaped by our situations, orientations, 
histories and emotions. A table becomes an object of significance for 
me only if I have a history of relating to tables or of activities that may 
require them. Ahmed quotes Paul Schilder: “The emotional configura-
tion determines the distance of objects from the body” (Ahmed 2006, 
54–55). In other words, our situations, histories and their concomitant 
affects, make certain possibilities salient in our experience while invisi-
bilising others. 
When thinking about shame anxiety as a present absence, we see 
precisely the horizonal structure outlined by Husserl and nuanced by 
Ahmed. Of course, shame is not a spatial object (like a table), but instead 
an affective experience. Nonetheless, the horizonal structure is paral-
lel. In shame anxiety, shame is absent, however it is also “present” as 
a “predelineated” possibility. This occurs through a process that can be 
understood through Ahmed’s conception of “orientations”. We become 
“oriented” to shame, and familiar with its contours, through understand-
ing and experiencing social norms. If our identity, appearance, or health 
status continually violates dominant social norms, then we may become 
“oriented” to the anticipation of shame. A fear of shameful exposure may 
come to chronically dominate our experience. 
To deploy Husserl’s language of the horizon: in experiences of shame 
anxiety, shame is “non-experienced” but “necessarily also meant”. As 
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both Thomas’s and Race’s accounts demonstrate, the fear of shameful 
exposure (of a shame which is presently absent and which may remain 
indefinitely absent), comes to structure experience: their expectations, 
feelings, thoughts, actions and social relations are impacted by the 
shame experience which exists “ just out of awareness” but nonetheless 
feels like a real and imminent possibility.15 Of course, certain contexts, 
situations and communities open up, or close down, horizons of pos-
sibilities in different ways. While shame anxiety may come to be part 
of the fabric of lived experience, it may also be heightened in particular 
spaces or contexts where one feels an intensified sense of self-conscious-
ness, difference or fear of exposure. In these spaces or contexts, one’s 
horizons of possibility may shrink to circle tightly around the fear of 
shameful exposure. In other spaces or contexts, where one is among 
“kin” – others who share or understand one’s identity, circumstances or 
health-status  and has a sense of acceptance and belonging, one’s hori-
zons of possibility may feel more capacious. In these instances, shame 
anxiety may be attenuated.16
Shame anxiety and health outcomes
Living with the permanent anticipation of shameful exposure is clear-
ly comprising for an individual. This persistent “orientation” towards 
shame, as an object “of thought, feeling and judgement” has conse-
quences (Ahmed 2006, 56). As Pattison notes, those who are “shame-
prone, shame-vulnerable or chronically shamed … often perceive 
themselves to be weak, inferior, ineffective, defiled, defective, unlovable, 
diminished, depleted failures” (Pattison 2000, 110). Living with such 
negative self-conceptions has concrete consequences for lived experi-
ence. As Philip Wüschner notes, the experience of consistent shame 
“reduces the hodological space to a suffocating level, minimising it to the 
very ground a person stands on” (Wüschner 2017, 103). In other words, 
the physical, social and affective spaces which contain the possibilities 
for action, engagement, and sociality are reduced so drastically – to use 
Wüschner’s metaphor to a point nearing suffocation – that the individ-
ual can feel immobilised. In phenomenological terms, the horizons of 
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possibility with respect to one’s actions, sociality and life chances, may 
become drastically reduced as one continuously implements strategies 
to circumvent shameful exposure and this is compounded by intense 
negative feelings regarding oneself and one’s social standing. Thomas’s 
testimony offers a powerful account of precisely this constriction; his 
motivation for confessing his HIV status is to lift the burden of shame, 
and in doing so, he invokes a resumption of life and freedom: “I want to 
remember what it’s like to live again; I want to remember what it’s like 
to feel free.”
Not only may chronic shame anxiety affect one’s behaviours, actions 
and interactions with others, it also has implications for one’s socio-
political position. As Jill Locke notes, “repetitive shame wears on the 
subject’s ability to inhabit, much less participate in and transform, the 
political world. Weariness readily translates into civic invisibility – a 
withdrawal from public life for some, a failure to engage in the first 
place for others” (Locke 2007, 153). In this way, chronically anticipated 
shame can be disempowering both socially and politically, which has 
obvious significance when considering highly stigmatised and politi-
cised conditions such as HIV.
It is precisely these personally and politically disempowering effects 
of shame that are being challenged in the celebration of “queer shame”,17 
where queer scholars, following Sedgwick, argue that “instead of deny-
ing or repressing queer shame [we] should aim to accept our differences 
from the dominant majority, acknowledge our shame, and make cre-
ative use of that shame” (Morrison 2015, 18). This “reframing” of shame 
is intended as an identity affirming move, which carves out a space of 
acceptance and non-normativity. Instead of being “stigmaphobes”, try-
ing to extract queer contaminants and to blend into conventional and 
normative life, those who can claim their shame aim to live as “stigma-
philes” (Warner 1999, 43), “accepting shame and stigma as motivating 
forces in their lives” (Morrison 2015, 22). While this aspiration towards 
queer defiance in the face of shame and stigma is compelling, it is worth 
thinking through what the genuine possibilities of reframing queer 
shame are for those living with chronic shame anxiety.
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While some may have the inner resources to reframe shame and 
stigma productively, many who are affected by the politics of shaming 
and the damaging effects of stigma, may not have the social capital 
nor the material or psychological resources to effectively name their 
shame in order to resist it. As Lisa Guenther notes, “shame attacks the 
very resources that one would need in order to resist shame, and to put 
in question the mechanisms that produce it and distribute it unevenly 
among subjects” (Guenther 2011, 24). Recalling the phenomenology of 
shame anxiety, shame is often hidden in one’s experience, manifesting 
only as an anticipation of shame: a fear or anxiety about the potential 
loss of social bonds and social standing. The chronic anticipation of 
shame may itself erode the potential for a positive reframing of shame, 
as shame continuously eludes our present experience, leaving us to reg-
ister instead an undermining sense of fear, anxiety and personal inad-
equacy, along with a strong sense of wanting to hide or withdraw. In 
addition, not all individuals will be able to take the social and politi-
cal risks associated with queering their shame. When we consider the 
material and social conditions of many individuals and groups living 
with HIV – for instance people living with other axes of disempower-
ment or marginalisation (e.g. race, gender, class, poverty, addiction) or 
who are simply burdened with the stress of ill-health or routine dis-
crimination – there are perhaps few who feel they can take these addi-
tional risks. 
Of course, this is not to suggest that resistance, activism and solidarity 
is impossible for those who experience chronic shame anxiety. As  Stangl 
et al. note, when considering stigma, “the interconnections between 
power and vulnerability … are fluid and complex” (Stangl et al. 2019, 4). 
There always exist concrete horizons of aspiration: possibilities for resis-
tance, re-framing, reclaiming power, and fighting social inequalities and 
unfair treatment. Jill Locke posits the idea of “unashamed citizens” as 
those who expose the “invisibilities, dominations, and inequalities” that 
are naturalised in social relations. These unashamed citizens, Locke 
argues, call out the shame that is (wrongly) imposed on them and, in 
doing so, act as “radically democratic” agents who “resist and disavow 
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the terms of shame” to agitate for more inclusion, compassion, and jus-
tice (Locke 2016, 173).18  These horizons of aspiration are important, 
and some of us can embrace the positive potential of queer shame, along 
with other forms of non-queer shame resistance, for creativity and iden-
tity formation. Nonetheless, it should be remembered that within these 
personal and collective projects of transformation, the negative effects of 
shame in broader socio-political contexts may not be eliminated, or even 
attenuated, for all those who are stigmatised, marginalised or (a)shamed. 
In short, not being able, or willing, to embrace queer shame should not 
itself become another source of shame/shaming.
In the context of considering HIV and its related stigma, it is impor-
tant to theorise how shame (actual and anticipated) can impact on health 
outcomes in various manners. There is an emerging literature exploring 
the link between the experience of shame and health outcomes, posit-
ing shame as an “affective determinant of health” (Dolezal & Lyons 
2017). The suggestion is that shame, as a chronic stressor, “may orches-
trate specific patterns of psychobiological changes” in the body which 
can exacerbate physical conditions (Dickerson, Gruenewald & Kemeny 
2004, 1191). For example, in a study of HIV-positive patients, experi-
ences of shame and threats to one’s social bonds correlated with illness 
progression and mortality. Interestingly, researchers found that experi-
ences of shame can “predict disease-relevant immunological and health 
outcomes in HIV” (Dickerson, Gruenewald & Kemeny 2004, 1191). 
In addition to possibly contributing to the burden of illness, the 
experience of shame anxiety also significantly impacts on health-related 
behaviours. There is evidence that the anticipation of shameful exposure 
in healthcare contexts can lead to a range of behaviours and outcomes 
which can negatively affect one’s health status and treatment (Dolezal 
& Lyons 2017, 259, Dolezal 2015b). Hutchinson and Dhairyawan high-
light five ways that shame negatively impacts the treatment of HIV: 
1. Shame can prevent an individual from disclosing all the relevant facts 
about their sexual history to the clinician.
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2. Shame can be a motivational factor in people living with HIV not 
engaging with or being retained in care. 
3. Shame can prevent individuals from presenting at clinics for STI and 
HIV testing. 
4. Shame can prevent an individual from disclosing their HIV (or STI) 
status to new sexual partners. 
5. Shame can serve to psychologically imprison people, it makes the task 
of living with HIV a far more negative experience than it should, or 
needs to, be (Hutchinson & Dhairyawan 2017a, 1).
While Hutchinson and Dhairyawan’s analysis of shame’s impacts on 
people living with HIV is insightful and important, what their theoreti-
cal study misses is the way shame related to health stigma is experienced. 
As we have seen, a phenomenological analysis reveals that shame is often 
experienced in the form of a present absence. It is often the potentiality 
of shame in the form of a fear of shameful exposure, rather than actuality 
of shame, that is a strong force to consider in health-related encounters, 
especially for highly stigmatised invisible chronic illnesses such as HIV. 
This distinction between potentiality and actuality is significant because 
the present absence of shame may be difficult to capture empirically. As 
Susie Scott notes, experiences which are “unmarked” or characterised by 
“non-presence” are often sociologically neglected (Scott 2018). This may 
be the reason why experiences of shame anxiety can remain undetected, 
invisible or difficult to articulate in socio-political and empirical analy-
ses of health-related stigma.
Conclusion
While health professionals are aware of how stigma can have nega-
tive effects in terms of how one experiences one’s illness, they can 
have difficulty directly addressing the effects of stigma in their clinical 
encounters. By contrast, if health professionals recognise shame and 
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shame anxiety as structurally related to stigma, then this may lead 
to concrete strategies and interventions that address some of stigma’s 
negative effects on health outcomes. Indeed, Bennett et al. suggest that 
“shame may … be more readily addressed than stigma by clinicians” 
(Bennett et al. 2016, 88). This, of course, may be for the simple reason 
that clinicians are more readily able to address, and work through, 
an individual’s experience of shame, whereas addressing and resolving 
stigma would entail structural, social and political change well beyond 
the scope of individual clinical encounters.19  A phenomenological 
analysis of the shame related to stigma, manifesting as shame anxiety, 
allows us to consider shame as a “present absence”, and to theorise 
how anticipated shame can be a powerful force in health contexts and 
with respect to health-related behaviours. Shame may not register as 
part of experience, either by patients or by healthcare providers, but 
may nonetheless be a key part of the horizon of experience, shaping an 
encounter or interaction as a result of shame avoidance strategies due 
to the ongoing fear of shameful exposure, as Thomas’s and Race’s pow-
erful accounts of keeping the secret of their HIV status demonstrate. 
Contradictorily, it is the absence of shame that becomes significant in 
experience. Theorizing the potential for shame, or shame anxiety, as 
a structural possibility in experiences of stigma may be a powerful 
means to understand the mechanisms through which stigma can cause 
distress and exacerbate negative health outcomes. 
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NOTES
1. In my use of the terms “phenomenology” and “phenomenological” I refer to 
the philosophical tradition of phenomenology, which originated with Edmund 
Husserl’s declaration of phenomenology as a philosophical method for describ-
ing the structures of first-person lived experience (Husserl 2002) generalisable or 
universalizable across all human subjects. I offer this clarification as the terms have 
slightly different significations across different disciplines: in the social sciences a 
“phenomenological analysis” can refer to an individual subjective account from the 
first-person perspective without any concern for structures of experience that can be 
universalised. My aim is to provide a phenomenological account of shame anxiety, 
which is generalisable across a variety of subjects, as a means of understanding how 
stigma registers in the textures of lived experience from a first-person perspective. 
2. I am drawing from Gareth Thomas’s account in the tradition of the phenomeno-
logical case study (Zahavi 2010, see also Merleau-Ponty 2012, 112). I would like to 
acknowledge the influence of Bonnie Mann and her article “Shame, Femininity 
and Redemption” where she insightfully analyses the first-person testimony of 
Amanda Todd through a self-posted YouTube video in order to draw out some of 
the structural features of what she terms “unbounded shame” (Mann 2018).
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3. Gareth Thomas’s video on Twitter “sharing his secret with you” - https://twitter.
com/gareththomas14/status/1172979157762039810?s=20 (Accessed March 9, 2020) 
(Thomas 2019).
4. Goffman’s account of stigma has been hugely influential and offers useful 
insights into the relational and contingent aspects of stigma, primarily focus-
sing on stigma’s personal and interpersonal manifestations. However, as Imogen 
Tyler argues, Goffman’s account of stigma is almost entirely politically vacuous; 
Goffman neglects to consider how stigma is connected to broader apparatuses of 
power and control and “excludes the fact that social relations are always already 
structured through histories of power (and resistance)” (Tyler 2020, 99). In short, 
Goffman’s account neglects the political dimensions of stigma, or, as Tyler argues 
in her reconceptualisation of stigma in Stigma: The Machinery of Inequality, how 
stigma is a political practice and an instrument of state coercion used to systemati-
cally oppress, marginalise and dehumanise certain individuals or groups. As Tyler 
points out, Goffman’s “interest is in how social rules work rather than in what they 
proscribe” (Tyler 2020, 99).
5. Stigma is by no means an easy phenomenon to define, especially when considering 
the many manifestations of health-related stigma. Going into the complexities of 
different types of stigma is beyond the scope of this paper, however Vickers offers a 
useful taxonomy of health-related stigma (Vickers 2000, 138–144). My contention 
regarding shame anxiety as the experiential component subtending stigma applies 
to the various categories of stigma outlined in Vickers’s taxonomy.
6. Jane Megan Northrop’s discussion of Hepatitis C gives an excellent example of an 
illness that can be concealed, but not entirely: one is legally obliged to reveal one’s 
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7. Drawing on Martha Nussbaum’s account of primitive shame (Nussbaum 2004) 
and Sartre’s account of pure shame (Sartre 2018), I argue elsewhere that shame 
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worst nightmare in the shape of a lethal form of intimacy” (Florêncio 2020, 199). 
Thomas’s experience may not reflect the wider experience of some gay men in the 
UK and elsewhere who, for the most part, live with less stigma around sexuality 
and HIV status, and who may be more informed about how HIV can be managed 
as a chronic condition. Nonetheless, Thomas’s account resonates with affective 
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words, that gay men live with HIV either as an “actual infection” or a potential or 
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